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Article 
An Economic View of the Housing Crisis 
CHRISTOPHER A. RICHARDSON 
This past year, 2008, was a watershed year in terms of the devastation 
in the United States residential housing market.  Not since the Great 
Depression have home values fallen so far and so fast.  A look at current 
housing market statistics such as median home prices, market inventories 
of existing homes, delinquency rates, and foreclosure rates suggests that it 
will be quite some time before the housing market returns to a sense of 
normalcy, with much economic pain to be felt by homeowners in the 
process. 
With the benefit of hindsight, one can see the seeds of housing market 
destruction were sown years ago through the deterioration of mortgage 
underwriting standards which inflated homeownership demand beyond 
sustainable levels, and the lax regulation of financial firms which 
facilitated the expansion of ever more complex structured finance 
derivative products without adequate capital requirements and risk 
controls.  It is clear that the U.S. must now plug the gaps in its regulatory 
structure and take the steps necessary to provide greater transparency of 
financial transactions, while laying out a clear set of comprehensive rules 
of the game for financial firms going forward. 
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An Economic View of the Housing Crisis 
CHRISTOPHER A. RICHARDSON∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
The bursting of the housing bubble in the United States left the 
residential housing market in a critical state in 2008, with no clear end in 
sight.  By all measures, house prices in 2008 fell rapidly.  According to 
data from the National Association of Realtors®, the median price of 
existing homes fell from a peak of nearly $222,000 in 2006 to slightly 
under $181,000 in November 2008.1  Similary, the Case-Shiller compsite 
index of house prices showed a precipituous year-over-year fall in prices of 
18.2% from November 2007 to November 2008.2  Areas of the United 
States that experienced larger increases in home prices, particularly in the 
western parts of the country, saw even larger declines from 2006 to 2008.3  
However, prices fell in all regions.4 
The stabilization of the housing market will depend fundamentally on 
achieving balance between the supply of and the demand for homes.  
Experts consider the housing market to be in equilibrium when the 
inventory of existing homes on the market equals about six months of 
                                                                                                                          
∗ At the time of The Subprime Crisis: Going Forward symposium held on November 14, 2008 at 
the University of Connecticut School of Law, Dr. Richardson was a Vice President at State Street 
Associates, a subsidiary of State Street Corporation.  Many thanks to symposium sponsors Connecticut 
Law Review and the Insurance Law Center, symposium brainchild Professor Patricia McCoy, 
Managing Editor of the Connecticut Law Review Krystna Cloutier, and the Connecticut Law Review 
staff.  Thanks also to the participants on my panel—Marsha Courchane, Lauren Willis, and Anthony 
Pennington-Cross—for sharing their insightful and timely research with symposium attendees and 
participants. 
1 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS®, EXISTING-HOME SALES, http://www.realtor.org/wps 
wcm/connect/88c8a5004cce73f7b8c7fbb7f7111181/research__EHS012609.pdf.pdf?MOD=AJPERES
&CACHEID=88c8a5004cce73f7b8c7fbb7f7111181 [hereinafter NAR SALES DATA].  
2 See J.W. Elphinstone, S&P Index Sows Plunge in November Home Prices, YAHOO! FINANCE, 
Jan. 27, 2009, http://finance.yahoo.com/news/SampP-Home-values-post-182-apf-14164793.html 
(“Nationally, prices in Case-Shiller's 20-city index tumbled by the sharpest annual rate on record, 18.2 
percent, as the deepening housing slump and national recession spared no region.”). 
3 See NAR SALES DATA, supra note 1 (showing that the largest decline in sales prices occurred in 
the western region of the country, where prices dropped $71,900 between 2006 and 2008); see also 
Elphinstone, supra note 2 (stating that, according to Case-Shiller’s 20-city index, the cities with the 
largest annual decline in home prices between November 2007 and November 2008 were Phoenix, Las 
Vegas, and San Francisco). 
4 See NAR SALES DATA, supra note 1 (indicating that the sales price of exisiting homes declined 
in all four regions of the country between 2006 and 2008). 
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supply (i.e., the existing inventory can be sold off in six months).5 
Currently, there is a huge excess inventory of homes that are on the market 
or vacant—in November 2008, housing inventory totaled about 4.2 million 
units, representing 11.2 months of supply.6  The housing market has not 
seen inventory of six months since the latter half of 2006.7  Prior to then, in 
the boom year of 2005, the inventory of existing homes was 2.8 million 
units, which represented only 5.1 months of supply.8 
Current sales trends do not bode well for the market regaining balance 
any time soon.  In 2005, more than 7 million existing homes were sold.9 
That figure fell to just under 6.5 million in 2006 and to 5.7 million in 2007 
as the mortgage market began faltering.10  By mid-2007, existing home 
sales had fallen to an annualized rate of slightly over 5 million, where they 
remained until November 2008, with preliminary figures indicating a 
decline to a rate of 4.49 million units.11   
Meanwhile, since 2006 the number of homes on the market has 
continued to grow.  In 2007, the housing market softened further, with the 
stock of existing homes on the market rising to nearly 4 million units, 
representing almost 9 months of supply for the year.12  And in 2008 the 
onset of recession, the spike in foreclosures, and the unraveling of the 
credit markets decimated the demand for housing, with home inventory 
fluctuating between 4 million and 4.5 million units, representing 10–11 
months of supply.13  Given these trends, the moribund housing market will 
not return to a sense of normalcy for some time. 
In addition, there are significant headwinds pushing against the 
clearing of the housing market, in particular the precipitous rise in 
mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures.  Data from the Mortgage 
Bankers Association’s National Delinquency Survey show that 6.99% of 
all mortgages outstanding were delinquent at the end of the third quarter of 
2008, the highest rate ever recorded by the survey.14  However, delinquency 
                                                                                                                          
5 See, e.g., REALTOR Magazine Online, Absorption Rate Key to Successful Pricing,  http:/ 
/www.realtor.org/RMODaily.nsf/pages/News2007111404?OpenDocument (last visited, Feb. 9, 2009) 
(“Six months’ supply is considered a balanced market . . . .”).  
6 See NAR SALES DATA, supra note 1. 
7 See id. (showing that, in 2006, home inventory had risen to 3.45 million units, representing 6.5 
months of supply). 
8 See News Release, National Association of Realtors®, Existing-Home Sales Down in December 
but 2005 Sets a Record, Jan. 24, 2006, http://www.realtor.org/press_room/news_releases/2006/ 
01/decehs05. 
9 See id. (“There were 7,072,000 existing-home sales in all of 2005 . . . .”).  
10 See NAR SALES DATA, supra note 1. 
11 See NAR: Poor Economy Takes Toll on Home Sales, REALTOR MAG. ONLINE, Dec. 23, 2008, 
http://www.realtor.org/RMODaily.nsf/pages/News2008122301?OpenDocument.   
12 See NAR SALES DATA, supra note 1. 
13 See id. 
14 Delinquency is defined as loans at least one payment past due but excludes loans in foreclosure.  
See Press Release, Mortgage Bankers Association, Delinquencies Increase, Foreclosure Starts Flat in 
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statistics are vastly different between prime and subprime mortgages: in 
the third quarter of 2008 the delinquency rate was 4.34% for prime 
mortgages but was 20.03% for subprime mortgages.15  Even more 
troubling are the rates of serious delinquency—mortgages ninety or more 
days delinquent—as these mortgages are very likely to end up in 
foreclosure without a major intervention by the lender, servicer, or 
governmental entity.  At the end of the third quarter of 2008, a whopping 
19.56% of subprime mortgages outstanding were seriously delinquent, 
compared with 2.87% of prime mortgages.16  Moreover, both the rate and 
the level of serious delinquency is much higher for subprime mortgages: 
the subprime rate increased 1.71 percentage points from the year-ago 
quarter, while the prime rate rose a smaller, but still vexing, 0.52 
percentage points from a year ago.17 
In many cases, the end result of serious mortgage delinquency is 
foreclosure.  In the foreclosure process, the social burden of the weakened 
housing market manifests itself to the greatest extent.  A foreclosed home 
is a losing proposition for borrowers, lenders, servicers, investors, 
neighborhoods, and state and local governments—particularly in a 
recessionary economic environment where a glut of homes on the market 
already exists.  Unfortunately, the mortgage delinquency statistics 
discussed above point to a continued increase in the already record-setting 
number of foreclosed homes for the foreseeable future.  In the third quarter 
of 2008, nearly 3% of loans were in foreclosure, a percentage that was 1.28 
percentage points higher than one year ago.18  The rate of foreclosure starts 
in the third quarter of 2008 was 1.07%, virtually unchanged from the 
previous quarter, but 0.29 percentage points higher than one year ago.19 
Before one can think in a meaningful way about possible solutions to 
the current housing market crisis, it is important to consider the forces that 
contributed to the market’s current state.  The next section provides a brief 
discussion of the confluence of forces that brought the housing market to 
its current weakened state.   
II.  FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO CURRENT MARKET DISTRESS 
As discussed in the Article by Marsha Courchane, one clear contributer 
to the problems in the mortgage and housing markets was weak mortgage 
                                                                                                                          
the Latest MBA National Delinquency Survey (Dec. 5, 2008), http://www.mbaa.org/NewsandMedia/ 
PressCenter/66626.htm. 
15 See id. (citing delinquency rates of 12.92% and 7.28% for FHA and VA loans, respectively).   
16 Id. 
17 Id.   
18 Id. 
19 Id.   
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underwriting standards.20  The Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officer 
Survey seems to suggest that underwriting standards began to deteriorate in 
late 2005.  However, underwriting standards probably began loosening in 
2004; stimulative monetary policy by the Federal Reserve pushed 
mortgage rates down to record lows and a steep yield curve provided banks 
and mortgage lenders with incentives to fund the origination of adjustable-
rate mortgages with low-cost short-term debt, with the expectation that the 
mortgages would be refinanced before the fixed-rate terms ended.  One key 
problem with mortgage underwriting standards over the past several years 
was that they were predicated on the assumption of continued increases in 
house prices.21  Mortgages with more accommodating underwriting 
terms—Alt-A and subprime loans in particular—were made under terms 
that made them unsuitable to be held by borrowers for long periods of 
time.  Perhaps the most widespread examples were the hybrid adjustable-
rate mortgage (ARMs) featuring a low “teaser” interest rate for the fixed-
rate time period, which increased substantially thereafter.  The rationale 
behind the popularity of ARMs was the expectation that such loans could 
be refinanced into new loans with more affordable monthly payments 
before the lower fixed-rate period of the loan term ended.  Borrowers 
would be able to refinance, so the reasoning went, as long as home values 
continued to increase.  Such reasoning was also behind the introduction of 
the option-adjustable mortgage (“option ARM”), a mortgage that allows 
the borrower to choose to make monthly payments that are less than the 
monthly interest charges, thus resulting in “negative amortization.” 
Mortgages with “exotic” underwriting features such as “teaser” rates 
on ARMs, negative amortization, interest-only (IO) amortization, reduced 
(or no) documentation of income and assets (so-called “low-doc” or “no-
doc” loans), and high loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) helped fuel the explosive 
growth in the demand for mortgages and homes during 2003–2006.  This 
increased demand led home builders to build more (and larger) homes, 
thereby increasing the supply of housing, which led to increased demand 
for more and larger mortgages; this continued in a virtuous cycle.  
Virtuous, that is, until the appetite for assets backed by non-prime (Alt-A 
and subprime) mortgages abruptly vanished in late 2006 and early 2007.  
Although the precise chain of causality is somewhat unclear (was the drop 
in secondary market demand for subprime mortgages caused by falling 
house prices, or did house prices start falling because subprime borrowers 
could not refinance as a result of a drop in secondary market demand?), it 
                                                                                                                          
20 See generally Marsha J. Courchane, Loan Originations/ Underwriting Standards: Recovering 
From the Subprime Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009). 
21 See Gary Gorton, The Panic of 2007, 3–4, 19–34 (Yale Univ. Int’l Ctr. for Fin. Working Paper 
Series, Paper No. 08-24, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=1255362#.  
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is fairly clear that as the performance of mortgages continued to deteriorate 
(first subprime and Alt-A mortgages, then prime mortgages as well), the 
structured securities created or derived from those mortgages—mortgage- 
and asset-backed securities (MBS/ABS), and collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs)—began to lose value and become more risky, and the 
demand and liquidity for these securities was decimated. 
Another factor contributing to the housing crisis was the failure of 
bank regulatory agencies—the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the FDIC, and the Federal 
Reserve—to require and enforce a tightening of mortgage underwriting 
standards before house prices leveled off.22  In the regulatory and economic 
environment in place during 2003–2006, one with a vibrant economy 
driven in large part by cheap financing and few prohibitions on risky 
lending, financial firms sprinted well ahead of their regulators by 
engineering new financial products that allowed banks and investors to 
create, package, re-package and sell cash flows that we now know carried 
considerably more risk than standard products.  Many of these products, 
such as CDO tranches and credit derivatives, contained not only the normal 
risk directly associated with the characteristics of the assets underlying the 
products, but added on a layer of counterparty risk, where the actions of 
secondary parties to the transaction may impact the value of the underlying 
assets of a financial product in ways that are difficult or impossible to 
quantify.23  Unfortunately, the increase in systemic risk created by these 
products often is not observable at the time the products are structured, 
given the tendency for new financial products to be structured at times that 
are favorable to the structurers and investors.  Consequently, regulators 
may be reluctant to impose restrictions on new financial products until 
there is evidence that there is a problem.  Sometimes, as was the case with 
the current credit crisis, by then it is too late. 
Given the benefit of hindsight, it is likely that early implementation of 
restrictions and oversight of the use of mortgages with particularly risky 
combinations of “exotic” features would have ameliorated the riskiness of 
market transactions.  The Article on product innovations by Souphala 
Chomsisengphet, Timothy Murphy, and Anthony Pennington-Cross, 
provides empirical evidence on the mismatch between mortgage borrowers 
and the mortgages they received during the housing market bubble 
                                                                                                                          
22 Two related factors in the overheating of the housing market were the push by the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to promote homeownership at the expense of focus on the 
availability of affordable rental housing, and HUD's reluctance to regulate underwriting for 
independent mortgage lenders that did not fall directly under the regulatory purview of the bank 
regulatory agencies. 
23 For a comprehensive narrative of the role of CDOs and credit derivatives in the credit crisis, see 
Gorton, supra note 21, at 34–45. 
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period.24  For example, their analysis indicates that 2007 interest-only 
mortgages were used in the Pacific region about four times more often than 
the amount predicted by economic and financial conditions, and non-
amortizing loans in the Pacific region were used about 20 percentage 
points more often than predicted.25 
Such misallocations of mortgage products are indicative of the type of 
decision failures discussed in the Article by Lauren Willis—in particular, 
failures that lead to inefficient transactions and are difficult to correct 
given the institutional barriers currently existing in the mortgage market.26 
Despite the deficiencies in the regulation of mortgage products, lax 
underwriting by itself was not enough to ignite a global financial crisis.  
Systemic risk in the financial system was propagated by the winds of 
securitization—the packaging of mortgages and other debt instruments into 
MBSs, CDOs, and other structured products.  The securitization of 
mortgages provided a way for investors to invest in fixed-income products 
tied to mortgages and other types of loans, ostensibly without having to 
assess the credit risk of each individual borrower.  Moreover, the tranche 
structure of MBSs created layers of bonds featuring different coupon rates 
and levels of prepayment and default risk, depending on the tranche's 
rating and priority in the “waterfall” structure of the MBS.  These 
individual tranches could then be sold directly to investors or bundled with 
other tranches from different MBSs (or other types of structured products 
backed by various types of assets) in the form of CDOs. 
While a thorough discussion of CDOs is beyond the scope of this 
Article, a key complication with CDOs is that computing their values is 
made difficult by the disconnect between the cash flows of each underlying 
asset and the cash flows of the various tranches of the CDO.  In fact, many 
CDOs backed by subprime mortgages received the highest AAA rating 
from private ratings agencies.27  Due to the difficulty of modeling and 
accurately pricing CDO tranches, investors for the most part relied heavily 
on the ratings given to the securities by the ratings agencies.  This head-in-
the-sand investing approach worked for investors as long as cash flows on 
the securities were not impaired (i.e., low defaults and high prepayments).  
                                                                                                                          
24 See Souphala Chomsisengphet et al., Product Innovation & Mortgage Selection in the 
Subprime Era 5–6 (Oct. 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=128876.  
25 Id. at 11–12, 32. 
26 Lauren Willis, Will the Mortgage Market 'Correct'?, 41 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).  
Willis lists as supply-side barriers to market correction: (i) characteristics of modern lending profit 
models, namely risk spreading, diversification and hedging, risk-based pricing, and pool-based 
profitability; (ii) limits on disciplining brokers and originators; (iii) limits on aligning servicer 
incentives; and (iv) no incentive to internalize social costs of the particular types of mortgages being 
provided.  Demand-side barriers to market correction include (i) a lack of responsiveness of borrowers 
to price signals; (ii) poorly calibrated borrower responses to risk; and (iii) unmoored risk preferences.  
Id. 
27 See Gorton, supra note 21, at 32–33 (providing a chart with ratings data from Moody’s, 
Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch, the major private ratings agencies). 
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Investors did not have to concern themselves very much with pricing and 
valuing opaque CDOs, as there was an active, liquid market for them 
which provided pricing data with which they could mark their portfolios to 
(mainly favorable) market prices.  Once the underlying assumptions about 
house price appreciation were breached, however, the ratings were shown 
to be unreliable. 
The role of CDOs and other structured products in the crisis should not 
be underestimated.  CDOs allow credit risk, market risk and liquidity risk 
to be packaged, sold, and hedged to investors willing to absorb those risks.  
However, it appears that the market was missing a backstop mechanism to 
ensure that investors that were willing to absorb credit, market, and 
liquidity risks from other parties were actually able to absorb them.  The 
collapse and subsequent bailout of AIG is a prime example of the perils of 
allowing the existence of what is essentially a specialized insurance 
market—in AIG’s case, the market for credit default swaps—without 
imposing controls—i.e., capital requirements—on the insurance writers to 
provide some assurance they will be able to honor their obligations to all 
counterparties.  Without such a backstop, systemic risk can grow virtually 
unchecked as counterparty risk rises.   
III.  WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
The collapse of liquidity that spread through the global financial 
system had its origin in the market failures evident in the residential 
mortgage market.  When all is said and done, trillions of dollars will have 
been spent by governments around the world in an effort to revive and 
restore credit markets.  Given the enormity of the economic problems we 
face both nationally and globally, where do we go from here? 
A viable blueprint for reforming the regulatory foundation of the US 
financial system was provided in a speech by then-Senator Barack Obama 
in March 2008—several months before both the meltdown in the debt 
markets in October 2008 and his election as President on November 4, 
2008: 
[T]here needs to be general reform of the requirements to 
which all regulated financial institutions are subjected.  
Capital requirements should be strengthened, particularly 
for complex financial instruments like some of the 
mortgage securities that led to our current crisis.  We 
must develop and rigorously manage liquidity risk.  We 
must investigate rating agencies and potential conflicts of 
interest with the people they are rating.  And 
transparency requirements must demand full disclosure 
 1142 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1133 
by financial institutions to shareholders and 
counterparties.28 
President Obama’s speech, heavily influenced by the ideas of former 
Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker,29 masterfully touched upon the 
major issues and provided an economically sound blueprint for 
strengthening and revamping the regulatory system.  With regard to the 
excerpt above, two further actions should be considered.  First, given the 
pervasiveness of lax underwriting in the current crisis, one key element to 
re-establishing a properly functioning housing market will be to tighten 
mortgage underwriting standards.  To a large extent this has already 
happened.30  Further tightening could take the form of prohibiting certain 
types of mortgages with questionable consumer value—particularly 
mortgages that allow for negative amortization.  Second, improved 
disclosure and transparency requirements will be effective only to the 
extent that financial products are structured in a way that allows them to be 
accurately priced.  Transparency, therefore, must apply to the individual 
assets constituting structured securities.  If structured securities are to be 
viable investment vehicles in the future, they must be structured in ways 
that can be properly modeled and priced by the market.31  Ultimately, 
reviving the residential housing market will require rebuilding and 
strengthening our regulatory foundation in ways that allow the market to 
function properly, while ensuring that the mistakes of some do not 





                                                                                                                          
28 Senator Barack Obama, Speech at Cooper Union: Renewing the American Economy 6 (Mar. 
27, 2008), available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/mmemmottpdf/obama-econ-speech-3-27-
2008.pdf). 
29 See Edward Harrison, Paul Volcker: Obama’s Other Economic Advisor, CREDIT WRITEDOWNS, 
Oct. 21, 2008, http://www.creditwritedowns.com/2008/10/paul-volcker-obamas-other-economic.html 
(emphasizing the importance of former Chairman Volker’s addition to President Obama’s economic 
team).  
30 See Memorandum, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, The January 2009 Senior Loan 
Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices (Feb. 2, 2009), available at http://www. 
federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/SnLoanSurvey/200902/default.htm (“In the January survey, the net 
fractions of respondents that reported having tightened their lending policies on all major loan 
categories over the previous three months stayed very elevated.”). 
31 Under this standard, so-called “CDO-squareds” (CDOs that contain other CDOs as underlying 
assets) and other manifestations of “derivatives of derivatives” would not be permitted.    
